The third anniversary of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine marks a crucial moment for European security and the broader liberal international order. Representatives from across Europe and the democratic world have gathered in Kyiv to reaffirm their collective commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and the fundamental principles of international law. This gathering of political leaders highlights not only the urgent issues arising from the conflict but also the need for a redesigned European security strategy.
French President Emmanuel Macron, one of Europe’s two nuclear-capable leaders, participated in high-level discussions with U.S. President Trump. Contrary to initial expectations, the meeting was less harsh than anticipated. Macron consistently stressed that any negotiations should include Ukraine and should not depict Russia as victorious. However, later that day at the United Nations, the United States voted against a resolution that condemned Russia and called for a just and lasting peace in Ukraine. In a surprising turn of events, the U.S. aligned itself with pariah states. This development highlights the growing change in United States policy. For much of the postwar period, European security has relied on the transatlantic alliance, with NATO playing a key role as the primary guarantor of regional stability. However, with Trump indicating a reduction in American engagement in the Old Continent security, European policymakers must face an uncomfortable reality: the era of unconditional U.S. security support is coming to an end. This critical turning point has caught the attention of several adversaries or potential ones, particularly China, which is closely monitoring Western unity. The implications extend beyond Europe to include Taiwan and other Indo-Pacific nations vulnerable to Chinese expansionism. In this context, Europe’s response to Russian aggression will serve as a test for the resilience of the rules-based international order.
There is an increasing urgency to enhance European defence capabilities. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen’s recent speech in Kyiv called for a significant increase in defence spending, exceeding the current NATO guideline of 2% of GDP and potentially reaching over 3%. This proposed increase reflects the understanding that effective deterrence and operational readiness require sustained investment. Despite the NATO commitment to a minimum defence spending threshold of 2%, many European nations have struggled to meet this target. Given the changing threat scenario, this figure is now viewed as insufficient. Transitioning to a 3% expenditure model would indicate a significant change in Europe’s defence commitments and would require significant investments in force modernization, expansion of the defence industrial base, and development of integrated operational capabilities.
To address the strategic challenges posed by Russia’s ongoing aggression and a progressive disengagement of the US, the European Union and the United Kingdom must focus on five critical areas of defence preparedness.
1. Increased Support to Ukraine
If the U.S. administration significantly reduces or eliminates military aid to Ukraine, European nations must proportionally cover this shortfall. This would require each European country to double its annual bilateral contributions to Ukraine. The European Union’s initiative to provide direct military aid through for example the issuance of EU bonds could offset some of these costs and distribute the financial burden more equitably among member states.
2. Enhancing Air Defense Capabilities
Europe remains largely dependent on U.S. air long-range air defence systems, particularly the Patriot system, to counter missile threats, since 2022 a total of 819 missiles have been ordered Bruegel.org. A substantial increase in defence spending potentially reaching 4.5% to 5% of GDP for at least two years should prioritise investments in Indigenous air defence systems, particularly anti-ballistic missile capabilities. Increased procurement of the SAMP-T system and ramping up its production output would be essential. Further efforts should focus on procuring more medium-range platforms like the IRIS-T and CAMM, as well as short-range ground-based systems, which have proven effective against low-speed threats, especially those that employ saturation tactics. The European Union should leverage its diplomatic and financial influence to secure technology partnerships, particularly with South Korea, which has advanced missile defence capabilities.
3. Developing Indigenous Missile Capabilities
To enhance EU and UK air power in potential high-intensity conflicts, Europe must improve its anti-radiation missile technology. Relying solely on the U.S.-made HARM system is unsustainable, particularly given potential realignments in U.S. foreign policy and the possibility that U.S. military resources may be engaged in the Indo-Pacific.
Europe must also develop long-range ballistic and cruise missile capabilities to deliver conventional unitary warheads to deter Russian aggression, particularly in critical areas such as the Suwałki Gap in Lithuania. These types of stand-off weapons would significantly raise the cost of aggressive actions for Russia, thereby enhancing Europe’s conventional deterrence capabilities which now are limited to the US use of Tomahawk cruise missiles.
4. Increase Stockpile Depth of Critical Munitions
Europe must significantly enhance its stockpile depth of essential munitions to ensure sustainability in a large-scale conflict. This includes increasing reserves of 155mm and 105mm artillery shells, small arms ammunition, anti-tank guided missiles, air defence missiles, air-to-air missiles and other fundamental war materials. The current rate of production and procurement is insufficient to meet the demands of a protracted conflict, requiring a coordinated effort across European defence industries to expand manufacturing capacity and logistics networks.
5. Expanding Military Manpower and Reserve Forces
In addition to increasing the size of their standing armies, European nations must reinforce their reserve forces. In a prolonged conflict scenario, professional military forces would likely bear the initial brunt of hostilities, necessitating a robust second-echelon force. Expanding and modernizing reserve training programs will be crucial to ensuring Europe’s ability to sustain prolonged military engagements if necessary.
The implications of Europe’s response to the war in Ukraine at this stage extend well beyond the immediate frontline. A failure to decisively strengthen European security capabilities will certainly empower other members of the “axis of Tyranny”, further undermining global stability. Conversely, a resolute and well-coordinated European defence strategy could serve as a solid deterrent, reinforcing the credibility of international law and democratic governance.
As Russia persists in its aggressive campaign, the strategic choices facing Europe are stark: either embrace a proactive security doctrine preparing for a potential confrontation from a position of strength or risk exacerbating vulnerabilities that could precipitate broader conflicts for which it will be not prepared. The time for pompous talks has passed, what is required now is a tangible and structural reform in European defence strategy. The future of European security depends on the resolve of its leaders to act with urgency.