0 Introduction
The Ukrainian Defence Forces (UDF) use FPV drones to shoot down Russian reconnaissance and strike UAVs. A number of interceptions are posted to media on a daily basis. In order to consolidate this information, I examined a significant amount of interception videos. In this article I will present a map of interceptions and corresponding statistics. In addition, I have compiled an overview of observable trends and noteworthy information that I uncovered while gathering the data.
1 The map
To begin, it would be of benefit to look at the map below for a moment, before reading further. Zooming in and out will help you to obtain a general view on the frontline regarding interception warfare, allowing you to check the details of any area that draws your interest.
The map can be displayed in two modes, with or without “Marker Stacking” :
– By default, you will see all interceptions displayed individually, which is useful for observing geolocated placemarks on the frontline.
– To observe all non-geolocated interceptions, in the bottom right-hand corner you can click the “Settings” icon and then enable the “Marker Stacking” option. Non-geolocated interceptions are displayed in Kyiv.
The map’s link : https://map.ukrdailyupdate.com/?lat=49.239121&lng=30.761719&z=6&c=1&l=0&ls=dro&dls=cur,she,att
Disclaimer : all materials used in this article have been meticulously collected from open sources, solely for the purpose of researching UAV interceptions. Dataset and all media files are accessible for researchers via link shared at the very last line of this article.
2 Statistics
As of 22nd of March 2025, the dataset contains 2517 unique interceptions, 2018 of which have been geolocated. No more than 3% of the videos in the dataset are duplicates. There has been a nearly 4-fold increase in the total number of interceptions since my previous publication in November 2024. Please bear in mind, this does not mean that 75% of interceptions have happened since then, because footage is often posted with significant delay, sometimes up to 6 months later. We will return to very cautious analysis of time/interceptions a bit later, so, for now, please take a look at the division of interceptions by the UDF, according to the model of drones used:
UDF-intercepted drones by model
The table above shows the quantity of interceptions by both model and camera type (day or thermal). Models listed above include both reconnaissance drones from Zala to SkywalkerVT265 and strike drones from Molniya to Dart. Furthermore, if we take a look at the table below this abstract, we will see numbers for these two individual groups, with the recon group being 20 times bigger than the strike group.
This significant difference can be explained by several factors that are apparent from the videos of interceptions. Strike drones usually fly at significantly lower altitude, this makes their detection and tracking harder for the UDF’s radar systems. Strike drones can operate in total radio silence mode, before they enter the Ukrainian rear areas. Last but not least – these drones spend less time in the air, because their goal is to find and attack a target, so there is no need for them to fly waypoints across a given area, which increases their vulnerability to interceptors.
Another difference for these two groups is the thermal/day ratio. In the recon drones group, 473 interceptors had thermal cameras, 1923 had day cameras, so the ratio here is 473/2396= 19.7% thermal. Strike drones accounted for 6 thermal cameras used and 115 day cameras, at a ratio of 6/121 = 4.96%.
UDF-intercepted drones by type
Let’s now take a look at the graph below, which shows the correlation between time to quantity, so this requires additional explanation. In September-October 2024 we have peaks on the graph that are followed by steep declines in the number of interceptions. I assess that in September-October, units were posting results of their work from previous periods. It is also plausible that the Russians were not fully aware that their drones were vulnerable and continued to fly an increasing number of them, despite their losses. In November-December we have a trough that can be explained by a combination of the exhaustion of Russia’s immediate reserves of drones, changes in tactic, poor weather conditions or exhaustion of Ukrainian storages of videos from the Spring-Summer 2024 period. Therefore, we cannot and should not seek to build the foundation of any analysis on this alone. What is interesting here is the proportion of these 4 groups – we can observe that enemy drone manufacturers did not drastically increase their supplies of any one, particular, model during this timeframe.
UDF-intercepted drones by month
The last statistical data I am going to present is, due to their public origin, not without its flaws. In this research, publications from social media networks were not always taken from the official sources of the units – sometimes it was CF YouTube channel, short video platform, messenger channel, etc. This has led to large amounts of duplicates and reposts of the same footage. Roughly every piece of interception footage has been posted at least twice, sometimes even more. Since eliminating duplicates is the primary challenge of this research and I filter them out by all means available, let’s not dive into unnecessary technical details. Instead, I want to highlight that I was surprised by an interesting fact – if an interception video has been posted and credited to a certain unit, then this interception will never be stolen or rebranded by another unit. Only 4-5 individual interceptions had credits of different units, which I must assume were a simple mistake made by those reposting the footage.
So here is the table with information on “which units were credited for interceptions”. Naming priority is brigade, if not known, then structure ( like DIU, STSS, SBU, UMF, etc. ), then regiment, battalion, group and so on. Please do not treat this data as an official performance rating.
As you can see, the top unit in the table is the 82nd Separate Air Assault Brigade. Their videos show that FPV-interceptors take a somewhat unusual engagement trajectory. FPV-interceptors often show enemy drones from beneath.
This is also noticeable among several units, like the 95th Separate Air Assault Brigade, the 127th TDF Brigade, the 411th Separate Regiment of UAVs “Yastruby”, but the 82nd Brigade uses a bottom-up attack path much more frequently than all the other units combined. Classification by approach path of FPV-interceptors has not been performed for the whole dataset, because of the videos’ length and a lack of resources for systematisation from my side. Nevertheless, the footage that we have is more than enough to make an educated commentary: The 82nd SAABr total interceptions are as follows: 196, with 138 being “from beneath”, 13 “from above” and 45 “tailing” approaches. In contrast, other units’ footage show a predominance of the “from above” and “tailing” approaches.
3 Technical Details of the FPV-interceptors
As of Spring 2025 we can claim with certainty : “The capabilities of FPV interceptors allow the reliable countering of enemy recon drones”. The FPV-interceptor is a general name for drones that are used for interception. There are many models of interceptors that share common key advantages in speed, altitude and manoeuvrability compared to enemy recon/strike drones.
The CF Prytula Foundation unveiled some characteristics of their wing-type FPV interceptor. Its price is 1600$ or 2500$ depending on the camera type (day/thermal). Its top speed is 160 km/h, with a range up to 35 km and a flight time of up to 1 hour.
CF Come Back Alive supplies UDF with quad-copter type FPV interceptors. From their interview with marine Jesus from 38th Separate Marine Brigade, we learn that their drones can easily climb 5000m in altitude and outmatch any enemy recon drone in that altitude. The quad-copter has also proven to be, by design, much more manoeuvrable than any wing-type drone.
Whether the wide range of these models and adaptability of their manufacturers will be able to both maintain the technical advantage of FPV interceptors and negate future improvements to enemy recon drones, we will see.
On this note, improvements of the russian drones require scrutiny. The Russians are actively trying to create counter-measures that will allow their drones to escape interception or increase their survivability. Public information does not provide many details on this topic, but we can clearly see the following upgrades have been installed:
– Camoflage
– Camera on the back + auto maneuver
– Antennas on Zala
– Antenna boxes on Supercam
Several other improvements are not visible on footage. In the image provided, we can observe how some of these modifications look through the lens of a Ukrainian interceptor.
As of now – all these improvements did not prove themselves as efficient.
But as Ukraine continues to fight for its freedom, we have to upgrade FPV-interceptors, to make them more reliable and simplify their usage.
Dataset holds 5 verified occurrences of insufficient impact on enemy drone. 3 of such cases are shown on the next picture, where number 1 – marks the first approach to the drone and subsequent explosion, 2 – marks second approach.
Taras Chmut, the head of the Come Back Alive CF in podcast hinted that special SW for automatic explosion can provide a solution mainly for high-speed Shahed interceptions, but it is reasonable to apply his words to recon drone interceptions also.
“…There are cases when Supercam or Zala continue their flight after the explosion of the FPV (interceptor). … You need “last mile software”, because when you close distance manually it is hard. And also you need to trigger the explosion at high speed”.
Now, let’s take a little step back and remind ourselves that there are 3 methods of shooting down an enemy drone using an FPV-interceptor : proximity explosion, ramming, or a shotgun installed on the interceptor.
Regarding the method utilized in the latter, Soldier “Vano” from the 93rd Separate Mechanised Brigade in “Ukrainska Pravda” video stated:
“In August we intercepted our first target. Back then, we were trying to intercept using an FPV armed with a shotgun, but it was an unsuccessful attempt. I missed the shot, so I decided to ram the Zala drone”. Here is the screenshot from that footage.
Some time ago, the UDF developed successful usage of the double-shotgun on heavy-load rotor drone against quad-copter type enemy drones. Original source is CF “LesiaUA”. After this, several more similar videos were posted and more brigades announced their own development of FPVs with mounted shotguns. Even though the shotgun approach failed several times, it might be revived with better SW for aiming and automated shooting. This will allow then to reuse their interceptor drones and lower the cost of one interception.
So, to combine both main points examined above into questions relating to this ongoing research –
- Will there be enhancements in software for proximity explosion or for shotgun usage?
- What role will automation have if FPV interceptors become too fast for humans to operate? We can reasonably expect automation to increase at current rates.
Currently the speed of an FPV-interceptor does not allow UDF to reliably shoot down long-range strike drones like Shahed. In publications, we have seen only one example of the successful chase of Shahed drone and one unsuccessful. Therefore, we can assume that this milestone is yet to be reached and, before it is, Ukraine can implement automation before the complexity of interceptions itself increases.
4 Conclusion
The FPV-interceptor has proved an effective solution to the problem of enemy drone strikes and reconnaissance. With limited resources, the UDF has implemented a scalable method that can protect the frontline from uninterrupted enemy supervision. Even though our war is very dynamic, FPV-interceptors will remain relevant and have continued potential for innovation.
In my assessment, future innovation can be expected within:
1. Management – frontline and rear cities require the protection of FPV-interceptors. Unit rotations should not leave areas without cover.
2. Automation – processes of detection, tracking, approach and the final initiation of the charge all have the potential to be controlled by software. In distant future innovation in this field could even allow the interception of cruise missiles, if meeting point is calculated correctly.
3. Capability – increases in the interceptor’s speed, which is currently a limiting factor for interceptions of the Shahed drones. This upgrade would significantly reduce Russian strike capabilities. But we have to remember that this upgrade should moderately raise the cost of an interception. Given current capabilities and projections, we have to avoid the development of any expensive new short-range surface-to-air missile, which requires complex accompanying ground facilities.
A wide range of future enhancements is therefore possible. To ensure these, manufacturers will require additional funding for R&D and feedback from the UDF. I encourage readers of this article to make donations to initiatives in this field. At their genesis, FPV-interceptors originated from the work of charitable foundations which have consistently proved themselves key elements in the FPV interceptor’s design and development. I am therefore adding links to top-3 projects relating to FPV-interceptions:
1. “Dronefall” by Come Back Alive CF. https://dronefall.webflow.io/main-eng
2. “Sky Rusoris” by Sternenko CF. https://send.monobank.ua/jar/2JbpBYkhMv
3. “Clear Sky” by Serhiy Prytula Foundation CF. https://prytulafoundation.org/about/projects/actual/chyste-nebo
Thank you for reading. This article would not have been possible without crucial informational support from Andrew Perpetua’s OSINT team (X: https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua, BlueSky: https://bsky.app/profile/andrewperpetua.bsky.social ).
You also may be interested in reading this article in Ukrainian language on Militarniy portal : https://mil.in.ua/uk/blogs/ukrayina-naroshhuye-potentsial-zenitnyh-droniv-analiz-perehoplen-ostannih-shesty-misyatsiv/.
Dataset contains more information than presented in the article, as interceptions are published daily. Will be available for downloading for several weeks.
Dataset : https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1Rvdix00yeZgLAefDHWr1y8tOOCusifot?usp=sharing