In this article, we will attempt to answer the following questions related to the ammunition storage infrastructure of Russia:
- How many large ammunition depots does Russia have?
- How many are within the range of Ukrainian long-range weapons?
- Where are the next strikes likely to be?
The interactive map below will give you the opportunity to follow along.
1. Events that have already occurred
Around 04:00 local time of September 18 2024, the town of Toropets in Tver Oblast, Russia, was awakened by a series of explosions. These rang out from the eastern side of the town where a large ammunition depot was built in the Soviet era.
The 107th Arsenal of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate (referred below by its Russian language acronym: GRAU), military unit 55443-ТТ (or 55443-42, see our earlier article for more details), was constructed no later than 1965. In the 2000s, a newer part of the arsenal’s complex was developed east of the original facility. Then, in the 2010s, a third part, to the southeast, was constructed and unveiled in 2019. For a more in-depth look into the visible issues with this last facility, a site which once boasted significant reinforcement to its structures, you can read our analysis on Twitter.
According to the Russian independent media outlet Astra, this was at least the third attack on the 107th Arsenal after previous unsuccessful attempts in May 2024 and June 2024. According to Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation, in addition to artillery ammunition, the base stored Grad rockets, S-300 missiles, S-400 missiles, Iskander missiles, and KN-23 missiles. According to a Ukrainian military source quoted by Suspilne, the base stored Tochka-U missiles as well.
Several damage assessments were conducted, with the earliest by Tochnyi showing substantial damage to the reinforced earth-covered magazines (ECMs) in the southeastern part of the facility. Later assessment by open-source intelligence group Oko Gora concluded that 76% of the storage units had been completely destroyed and 13.5% were damaged.
Just three days later, in the early hours of September 21, two more attacks on large ammunition storage facilities occured. The initial reports, at around 05:00 local time, came once again from the direction of Toropets. The facility attacked this time was the 23rd Arsenal GRAU, military unit 55443-ТП (114), located just a few kilometers to the south of the 107th Arsenal.
Since then, information has been disclosed regarding a series of deliveries of anti-air missiles from Belarus’s 1562nd Separate Anti-Aircraft Repair and Technical Base to the 23rd Arsenal GRAU; deliveries which might have preceded the strike. According to released images, each of the 94 freight wagons contained 4 missiles, giving a total of 376 missiles that may have been delivered to that base.
Less than an hour after the strikes on 23rd Arsenal, videos started pouring in of explosions near Tikhoretsk where the 719th Artillery Ammunition Base (military unit 57229-41) was located. This base became known as one of the facilities where North Korean ammunition transfers were suspected to have been stockpiled, prior to their use in Ukraine. An unsuccessful attack had been reported near Tikhoretsk in June.
In both of these cases,it is possible that the attacks were timed to coincide with deliveries of additional materiel by train. These freight wagons appear to have been completely destroyed by the explosions.
Below is a damage assessment summary by Oko Gora, based on available satellite imagery:
| Storage Base | Destroyed | Damaged | Intact |
| 107th Arsenal GRAU | 101 (76%) | 18 (13.5%) | 14 (10.5%) |
| 23rd Arsenal GRAU | 71 (66.4%) | 12 (11.2%) | 24 (22.4%) |
| 719th Artillery Ammunition Base | 247 (93.6%) | 8 (3%) | 9 (3.4%) |
Also on September 18, 2024, an event reported as an attack on the 856th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment took place. However, it is more likely that this was an attack on the 19th Arsenal GRAU (previously military unit 21225) located adjacent to the regiment’s headquarters. Another UAV attack in the same area was reported on September 1, 2024. No further information is publicly available about these attacks.
On September 29, 2024, the 117th Arsenal GRAU near Kotluban, Volgograd Oblast, was attacked. This attack appears to have been unsuccessful. This facility was previously attacked on at least 3 occasions. You can find more information about the facility in the “Aftermath and potential future strikes” section below.
These are not the first attacks Ukraine has conducted on large ammunition storage facilities. On August 1, 2023, explosions were reported near the 3413rd Engineering Ammunition Base, military unit 63876-Р. This same storage facility was attacked again on October 18, 2023.
On September 23, 2023, an ammunition storage base near Sukharna Balka, Crimea, was reportedly attacked successfully. That strike was likely against the 17th Arsenal of the Navy, previously military unit 63859, now a subunit under 758th Logistics Center of the Black Sea Fleet (military unit 63876).
On July 31, 2024, an attack was reported on the artillery ammunition storage base near Khalino, Kursk Oblast. This base serves as the location for the 110th Arsenal of the Air Force, previously military unit 42699, now military unit 55443-КА (20). Damage to the facility’s storage structures was observed on satellite imagery later published by Radio Svoboda.
Despite the timing of the above attacks, there are observable distinctions in both the types of targets and the potential weapons used to perform the strikes. The strike targeting can be divided into two broad categories: hardened targets and light targets.
Within the first category we can classify the 107th Arsenal GRAU. The other two depot strikes can be considered light targets. The key difference between these two depot types is found in the type of construction present at each depot. In the case of the 107th Arsenal, half of the site consisted of reinforced concrete ECMs, with the other half being above-ground magazines (AGMs) and open-air stockpiles. Conversely, the other two ammunition depots were characterized by their abundant use of open-air stockpiles, with the sole protection being soil embankments.
The 719th Artillery Ammunition Base provides a clear example of the vulnerabilities of the latter type of target. The video below shows the site before the strike and the resulting damage . Most of the buildings were located above ground and do not show signs of reinforced construction. The rest of the depot is an open-air site. There is extensive evidence of explosions and debris throughout the entire site, but no significant crater can be identified. It is likely that this site, along with the 23rd Arsenal GRAU, was attacked by long-range drones capable of initiating a cascade of events that led to the destruction of the site entirely.
The apparent use of multiple weapon systems which a the strike on the 107th Arsenal GRAU can be attributed to the dual composition of the target. An analysis of the hardened structures in the following picture has also been covered by the authors on Twitter.
2. General structure of an ammunition storage facility
When researching the history of Russian ammunition depots, it is important to examine another significant source of information: accidents. These accidents are crucial in both identifying commonality among the issues within such sites and to understand why the Russian Federation initiated a significant safety program in the mid-2000s to secure one of the largest legacies of the Soviet Union – a vast amount of ordnance including propellant, artillery shells, and missiles.
The authors have been able to track and gather information on 14 accidents (Appendix: Table 3)at various ammunition depots. In some cases the accident has occurred twice, as was the case for the 99th Arsenal GRAU near Urman and the 102nd Arsenal GRAU near Pugachevo.
All the accidents were widely covered by Russian media, in some cases in a notably critical manner involving purported investigative journalism concluding in a seemingly harsh analysis claiming corruption and highlighting public disappointment at repeated failures by the Ministry of Defence.
To better understand the typical layout of a Russian ammunition depot, it is necessary to explore the structure of an arsenal and how it has changed since the early 2000s after several attempts at performance improvement. A good example of the classical post-Soviet Union ammunition depot is that of the 102nd Arsenal GRAU, which is shown in the Figure 1 below and is by now likely decommissioned.
This type of ammunition depot is characterized by a dense use of the ground with a significant number of ammunition storage areas, which do not show any type of reinforcement. This particular ammunition depot also lacks any embankments, which can prevent potential secondary explosions. This absence is probably the root cause of the repeated accidents at the 102nd Arsenal and the 99th Arsenal.
Similar structures can be found in several other arsenals and warehouses within 500 km of the Ukrainian border. Among the many identified in this report, we have selected three such structures, all of which share common vulnerabilities such as a lack of adequate protection against strikes, minimal distancing between AGMs, and the use of trees and foliage to conceal the site (see Figure 2). These facilities are highly susceptible to explosions and fires, which can spread rapidly, especially during dry seasons. This can lead to small accidents that may serve as precursors to larger ones. It is worth noting that there is a correlation between the timing of these accidents, with most occurring during warmer periods when more work is typically performed and dry grass is more likely to be present. We can assign this storage facility a “Class 1”, the lowest in a ranking system we will introduce here.
A type of ammunition depot featuring more hardened structures than a Class 1 depot is shown in Figure 3 – a recent aerial view of the 67th Arsenal GRAU. This Class 2 type facility incorporates important details that make it stand out compared to the previous class. Soviet-era ECMs are highlighted in red. While these Class 2 storage facilities are old, they offer an observably superior level of protection compared to the non-armoured AGMs of Class 1 facilities. However, Class 2 ammunition depots show the presence of large ammunition stocks in open air, highlighted in green, often protected by soil embankments. Lastly, large warehouses with no sign of reinforcement are often observed. In some cases, these have minimal to no perimeter walls (highlighted in violet) and are mostly intended to protect ammunition from environmental conditions and low-level threats (see Figure 1 above). Most of the Class 1 and Class 2 depots have an inferior design, where several AMGs are seen placed very close to each other.
The 107th Arsenal near Toropets and 13th Arsenal near Kotovo (see Figure 5), and facilities similar to them, are assigned a Class 3 designation. Sites in this class show significant changes in the ammunition storage facilities. In particular, new ECMs and AGMs with embankments and barricades have been constructed. However, for logistical reasons or due to space requirements, these facilities tend to still use open-air stockpiles, usually protected on three sides by simple embankments. These sites are to be considered the most valuable ones since they often have a significant number of ECMs compared to lower-tier sites.
3. Aftermath and potential future strikes
On September 22, 2024, the governor of Vladimir Oblast, Russia, reported that evacuation measures were taken overnight in both the Kirzhachsky District and Melenkovsky District, presumably due to an air raid signal. The two districts are located approximately 200 km from each other, but both feature large ammunition storage facilities:
- 51st Arsenal GRAU, military unit 55443-ВМ (124), is located near the village of Barsovo, Kirzhachsky District.
- 2161st Central Aviation Base of Missile Armament and Ammunition, military unit 55443-ГУ (133), is located near the village of Zlobino, Melenkovsky District.
Both of these facilities are located over 500 km from the border with Ukraine. It is unclear if an actual threat existed or if these were precautionary measures. Nevertheless, it shows a high level of concern from the local authorities.
The three large ammunition storage facilities successfully targeted in September 2024 so far are located at the following distances from the nearest area controlled by Ukraine:
- 107th Arsenal GRAU: 465 km
- 23rd Arsenal GRAU: 450 km
- 719th Artillery Ammunition Base: 370 km
It can be assumed that the maximum operational range of the weapons used by Ukraine is approximately 500 km. Having in mind the success these attacks have achieved, it is unlikely they will be the last. The following large ammunition storage facilities are located within 500 km from Ukraine-controlled territory:
- 117th Arsenal GRAU, military unit 57229-51 (48°59’48.14″N 44°12’52.03″E)
This facility, located some 430 km from the frontline, was reportedly attacked at least three times: on November 16, 2023, on November 24, 2023, and on March 8, 2024 (videos from one of the attacks). A freight train was attacked, reportedly by drones, on May 13, 2024, at the train station near the storage base. More recently the arsenal was attacked again on September 29, 2024.
The facility underwent a large-scale renovation in 2021 and 2022. Most of the work was done in the northern part of the site where 9 ECMs have been built. A number of other ECMs have been constructed in the northeastern part, leading to a total of 12 ECMs on site. These structures have the same dimensions and exhibit similar marks of the construction process as in Toropets, and as a result they share several flaws. Spacing between the structures in this case is significantly less than what was seen in Toropets.
- 68th Arsenal GRAU, military unit 57229-40 (43°44’17.97″N 44°31’22.40″E)
This base may be located just outside of the assumed 500 km strike range. This is reportedly one of the major facilities where ammunition transferred from North Korea is stockpiled. Additionally, two shipments of ammunition have been made to this base from Belarussian bases in 2024:
- 12 wagons of artillery ammunition from 391st Artillery Ammunition Base;
- 4 wagons of explosive materiel from 1562nd Separate Anti-Aircraft Repair and Technical Base.
Figure 6 below displays the 68th Arsenal GRAU in 2003 and in 2021, clearly demonstrating the differences between a Class 2 and a Class 3 site. In this specific installation, most of the open-air stockpiles have been replaced by ECMs. All the ECMs have embankments to protect their entrances, but not the sides. Often the ECMs are quite close to each other. This critical vulnerability is present in all facilities with ECMs in the Russian Federation. The total number of ECMs on site has increased to 31 as of 2021.
- 19th Arsenal GRAU (52°51’22.43″N 33°28’27.51″E)
This arsenal was likely attacked on September 18, 2024, at the exact same time 107th Arsenal was attacked. A video of the explosion was geolocated at the 856th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment, next to the arsenal. It is unclear what was hit.
Thise facility is classified as a Class 2 site due to the absence of open-air stockpiles and the presence of Soviet-era ECMs. Most of the structures show signs of aging visible even on satellite imagery.
There are 24 Soviet-era ECMs on site, with half concentrated at the center of the base and the rest located in the southern part, partially hidden by trees. This site displays an unsafe use of ECMs, located too near to each other. Additionally, the site structure is reliant on trees for blast protection and concealment, shown to be insufficient in previous strikes on similar targets.
As a result of the three successful attacks in September, Russia may decide to further disperse its ammunition storage sites. This strategy comes with significant drawbacks. Russia traditionally relies on railway infrastructure to make large-scale deliveries of materiel. Rail lines run across many ammunition storage facilities, or they run in the immediate vicinity of the facilities. Dispersion results in an inability to utilize this Russian superpower.
Large ammunition dumps currently exist further away from the frontlines and into Russia proper, as evidenced by regular strikes on such temporary repositories. Some examples of such strikes are presented in Table 2 below.
| Date of Attack | Nearby Place | Approximate Location | Sources |
| 2024-03-14 | Tetkino, Kursk Oblast | 51.273777, 34.280819 | https://x.com/MalcontentmentT/status/1769890385189617788 |
| 2024-06-02 | Gremuchiy, Belgorod Oblast | https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/ammunition-depot-catches-fire-in-belgorod-1717439030.html | |
| 2024-06-09 | Rakitnoye, Belgorod Oblast | 50.856284, 35.908206 | https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1799782526342570375 |
| 2024-06-25 | Olkhovatka, Voronezh Oblast | 50.289960, 39.257510 | https://x.com/kromark/status/1805613648150225153 |
| 2024-07-07 | Sergeyevka, Voronezh Oblast | 50.435807, 39.811158 | https://x.com/bradyafr/status/1810286460081250538 |
| 2024-08-24 | Novaya Melnitsa, Voronezh Oblast | 50.803829, 39.014353 | https://x.com/cyber_boroshno/status/1827142264226795932 |
| 2024-09-07 | Soldatskoye, Voronezh Oblast | 51.057914, 39.017255 | https://x.com/kromark/status/1833589514713108664 |
Russia may decide to relocate larger ammunition stockpiles beyond the presumed strike range of 500 km. However, this would not guarantee safety. In September 2024, Ukrainian drones were spotted flying over Murmansk, reportedly on at least two occasions, 1,800 km from Ukraine. In April 2024, a large unmanned aircraft hit a production facility (reportedly for Shahed type drones) near Yelabuga, Tatarstan, approximately 1,200km from Ukraine.
Another option would be for Russia to relocate parts of its stockpiles to areas Ukraine is lesslikely to attack. The best example in this regard is the large storage facility near Cobasna, Transnistria, just a few kilometers from the border with Ukraine. Officially on Moldovan territory, the 1411th Artillery Ammunition Depot stores approximately 20,000 tons of ammunition, but it has so far experienced no credible military action from Ukraine.
As a hypothetical example: ammunition stored in 68th Arsenal located near Mozdok, North Ossetia, could be moved to South Ossetia or to Abkhazia, both internationally recognized as parts of Georgia. Even larger transfers could be made to Belarus. However, recent revelations suggest that large weapons transfers from Belarus to the 23rd Arsenal might have coincided with the recent Ukrainian strikes on the facility. This may make such relocations back to Belarus more unlikely.
Overall, the three successful strikes in September 2024, and any expected future strikes, will further complicate the logistics of the Russian army. The problems present at the major storage facilities are structural and not easily redeemable in the short term. Thus, available strategies involve further dispersion or putting more distance between Ukrainian launch points and the ammunition stockpiles, a repetition of the situation immediately after the introduction of HIMARS in 2022, on a larger scale, and thus much harder to resolve. Either of these solutions would put pressure on the Russian non-railway transportation networks. Trucks would have to make more trips and travel longer to make deliveries.
Appendix
Appendix 1: Known large-scale accidents in Russian military facilities, related to ammunition handling (2009-2020).
The authors have been able to track and gather information on 14 accidents at various ammunition depots. In some cases the accident has occurred twice, as was the case for the 99th Arsenal GRAU near Urman and the 102nd Arsenal GRAU near Pugachevo.
| Date | Likely Facility Where the Accident Occurred |
| 2020-10-07 | 97th Arsenal GRAU near Strashelemishevskiye Khutora, Ryazan OblastPotential causes are agricultural fire and mismanagement of the fire that reached the open air ammunition. |
| 2019-08-05 | Ammunition warehouse near Kamenka, Krasnoyarsk Krai, military unit 58661-БВ (49) The warehouse was being dismantled when an explosion occurred in an old shell warehouse. Poor handling of the shell causing detonation and creating a cascade effect, appear to have been the cause. |
| 2018-05-16 | 102nd Arsenal GRAU near Pugachevo, Udmurt RepublicThis was the second accident on this arsenal, and still very much related to the very poor condition of the ammunition and a lack of contingency plans for cascade events. |
| 2015-06-03 | 99th Arsenal GRAU near Urman, BashkortostanDry grass and gunpowder in a warehouse were, apparently, the root cause of a large fire that spread over the site triggering a larger explosion |
| 2014-04-29 | Ammunition warehouse near Bolshaya Tura, Zabaykalsky Krai |
| 2013-06-18 | Volga State Ammunition Testing Range near Chapayevsk, Samara Oblast |
| 2012-10-09 | Anti-Aircraft Ammunition Testing Range near Donguz, Orenburg Oblast |
| 2012-06-11 | 2173rd Artillery Ammunition Depot near Kotlubanovskiy, Orenburg Oblast |
| 2012-05-18 | 135th Artillery Ammunition Depot near Sungach, Primorsky Krai |
| 2011-06-02 | 102nd Arsenal GRAU near Pugachevo, Udmurt RepublicThis event caused a public outcry as it affected a large number of locals, 13,000 citizens. Despite this public pressure, however, no significant information regarding the accident was published. Poor handling of the ammunition by non-trained personnel can be attributed to being the cause of this incident. |
| 2011-05-26 | 99th Arsenal GRAU near Urman, BashkortostanThis accident was caused by an external contractor, who was working on-site to dispose of ammunition. The core issue appears to have been poor safety procedures, but also highly inadequate site design. |
| 2011-04-06 | 63rd Arsenal GRAU near Dachnyi, Voronezh Oblast |
| 2010-10-28 | 180th Artillery Base near Arga, Altai Krai |
| 2009-11-13 | 31st Arsenal of the Navy near Kolkhoznyi, Ulyanovsk Oblast |
Appendix 2: List of additional sites where potential new attacks may take place.
- 110th Arsenal of the Air Force, military unit 55443-КА (20) (51°42’10.1″N 36°17’14.2″E)
- 67th Arsenal, military unit 55443-БК (41) (53° 8’34.42″N 34°57’5.27″E): This facility was likely attacked on August 6, 2023.
- 120th Arsenal, military unit 55443-БМ (51) (53°13’22.93″N 34°23’34.90″E)
- 63rd Arsenal, military unit 55443-ЛК (117) (52°31’8.39″N 39°44’57.21″E): An accident occurred in this facility in 2011.
- 1962nd Ammunition Warehouse, military unit 55443-РД (40) (53°13’34.0″N 36°26’06.0″E)
- 60th Arsenal, military unit 55443-КД (116) (54°31’23.28″N 36°19’24.62″E): This facility was reportedly attacked on February 6, 2023.
- 97th Arsenal, military unit 55443-РК (119) (53°43’53.33″N 39°49’55.30″E): An accident occurred in this facility in 2020.
- Military unit 55443-128 (51°46’51.33″N 39°30’23.14″E)
- 1103rd Engineering Ammunition Base, military unit 57229-54 (43°59’40.65″N 43°34’31.89″E)
- 28th Arsenal of the Air Force (Space Forces) (52°27’33.32″N 41°27’41.52″E)
- 75th Arsenal GRAU, military unit 55443-ГС (118) (54°55’53.64″N 37°24’43.85″E)
- 55th Arsenal GRAU, military unit 55443-123 (56°14’51.05″N 34° 7’36.58″E)
- 30th Arsenal GRAU (55°28’32.37″N 36° 3’14.50″E)
- 59th Arsenal GRAU (55°51’15.6″N 37°42’32.3″E)
- 86th Arsenal of the Air Force (55°41’17.84″N 38°27’32.83″E)
- 19th Arsenal of the Air Force, military unit 57229-38 (47°19’24.55″N 39°37’24.09″E)
- 3413rd Engineering Ammunition Base, military unit 63876-Р (44°36’24.28″N 33°40’25.81″E): This facility was likely attacked in August 2023 and in October 2023. The current status of the facility is unknown.
- 17th Arsenal of the Navy (44°37’29.36″N 33°35’14.53″E): This facility was likely attacked in September 2023. The current status of the facility is unknown.