The Logistics System of Russia: Storage Facilities

There are a variety of ways the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine could potentially end, or, more precisely, there are many factors which could force the end of it. One of these factors would be Russia or Ukraine having their stocks of key weaponry either exhausted or reduced to a state which renders infeasible their ability to sustain their respective combat forces. For Ukraine, should any of its equipment reach significant levels of depletion this would largely be a matter of political will outside of Ukraine, and thus unquantifiable within the scope of this research. For Russia, however, there exists a resource of data relating to this topic, which this article will examine.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24th February 2022, certain countries have shown a willingness to sell, and indeed supplied, military equipment to Russia. Such equipment has thus far consisted largely of ammunition and other ‘disposable’ weaponry, such as missiles, one-way attack drones, and miscellaneous spare parts. Other than transfers from limited Belarussian reserves back in 2022, however, there have been no records released of heavy equipment sales. One of the reasons for this could be that the countries aiding Russia in its war do not possess sufficient amounts of heavy military equipment in storage, neither surplus that they would be willing to part ways with even in exchange for significant financial gain. Thus, in a protracted war, Russia is left relying to a large extent on its stored armaments from the Soviet era. With this in mind, let’s review Russia’s military storage and related logistics system.

In the late Soviet period, and up until the 2000s, most heavy military equipment in Russia was stored in specialized facilities. For instance, artillery and most types of large caliber ammunition were stored in over 100 individual arsenals.

Typically, a storage base would get set up based on a decommissioned or downsized active unit. Over time this has resulted in a rather messy system with hundreds of facilities of various degrees of importance, the smallest of which were being handled by reportedly just a handful of people. Thus, one of the operations that was reorganized during the so-called Serdyukov reforms of the late 2000s and early 2010s, was the system by which these storage facilities were structured. In particular, and more important from this article’s point of view, all storage facilities became under the centralized control of ‘Logistics Centers’ (direct translation from Russian: “centers for material and technical support”). Each Military District and each Fleet was assigned one such logistics center, as the following table illustrates:

Of note in Figure 2 is the 758th Logistics Center. This was set up under the BSF command following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and is the most recent addition to this list. In an interview, the commander of that particular logistics center Oleg Zhivkin provided details about the structure of the center, which consisted of:

• A headquarters
• 8 storage bases
• 4 warehouses
• 3 stations
• 1 separate department
• 1 laboratory

More details on the specific facilities can be found in this investigative analysis (in Russian).

The Caspian Flotilla used to have a dedicated logistics center for a brief time under this new system. However, that center was later merged into the 1061st Logistics Center of the Southern Military District.

Each storage base or other storage facility within each logistics center is designated a unit index number. It then in essence becomes a subunit to its assigned main military unit (the logistics center). Although there are two variations of Russia’s index numbering for these Logistic Centers, a number and a letter (or two letters), it appears that in practice only one of these variations is being used. Figure 3 below displays an example of this system.

The index numbers displayed appear to run consecutively, starting with #1 – the logistics center headquarters. Ignoring Russia’s decommissioned storage facilities, we can gauge the total number of storage facilities across all logistics centers combined. Figure 4 shows the last subunit index number for each logistics center.

Summing these up gives us at least 470 storage facilities. Evidence suggests that some of these have been decommissioned or merged, so the actual number may be closer to 400. In some sources, the number of 330 storage facilities is mentioned.

Interestingly, not all Russian Logistics Centers appear to be using the same index number system in practice. For instance, EMD and SMD appear to use only digits, while NF uses mostly letters. Additionally, the letter-based index numbers usually run consecutively from ‘А’ onwards, with the exception of WMD where the letter designations appear randomized. 

With other Logistics Centers, the unit under number 4 is usually (but not always) designated letter Г – the fourth letter in the Russian alphabet. However, at the 1060th Logistics Center of WMD, which doesn’t use numbers 2 to 9 for its subunits as it seems, subunit 13 is designated letters ТА. According to comments we have seen, the letter designations with this Logistics Center are related to the location of the unit. For instance, military unit 55443-51 is designated using the letters БМ (BM in English), because its official address is г. Брянск, Московский проспект, д. 10 (Bryansk, Moskovsky Prospekt 10). Thus, that unit could be referred to, in various documents, as either 55443-51, or as 55443-БМ.

Nevertheless, this system of subunit number designations allows for a higher level of confidence on the number of storage facilities. Figure 5 shows an example map of the storage facilities under 1062nd Logistics Center, CMD.

Depending on their function and the equipment they contain, each Logistics Center includes a wide variety of storage facilities. One military subunit can consist of more than one category of storage facilities. The following major categories are observed:

• Heavy equipment storage (tanks, armored vehicles, artillery systems, trucks and trailers)
• Missiles, ammunition and explosives storage
• Specialized equipment storage (communications; engineering; radiological, chemical, and biological protection; topographic maps; a variety of others)
• Aviation facilities and naval facilities
• Fuel and lubricants storage
• Rocket fuel storage
• Small arms and close combat weapons storage
• Workshops
• Experimental design facilities
• Clothing storage
• Food storage
• Storage of education materials

Not all of these storage facilities are visually similar on satellite imagery. A clothing storage or topographic maps facility may look more like the second floor of an administrative building. At the same time, a heavy equipment or ammunition storage facility can usually be seen rather clearly in satellite imagery. The general layout of such a storage base is presented in Figure 6. The designated areas are as follows:

1. Equipment area
2. Sorting yard
3. Outside security fence
4. Blast field
5. Helipad
6. Administrative area
7. Barracks
8. Residential area
9. Area for collection and destruction of production waste materials
10. Filtration area
11. Water intake structure
12. Rubbish dump for the administrative and residential areas

In 2016, Russia decided to restructure a large number of storage facilities into 24 “Production and Logistics Complexes” (PLCs). At that time, the stated goal was for the process to be completed by 2020. Each PLC is planned to contain several designated areas, as shown in Figure 7, which include:

• Military equipment storage area
• Fuel storage area
• Warehouses
• Commercial zone
• Administrative area
• Parking area

In 2021, a Russian report stated that construction of the sixth PLC had begun, so this restructuring progress appears to be running far behind schedule. Figure 8 shows a map of the planned facilities, while Figure 9 lists the general location of both the individual facilities and the existing storage unit each facility is planned to be based on.

The facilities near Arkhangelsk, Sevastopol, and Vladivostok were expected to serve as pilot projects. However, the only known completed PLC is “Nara”, near Naro-Fominsk, Moscow Oblast (see Figure 10). This facility is located at 55°22’18.32″N, 36°41’32.19″E.

Additional, albeit limited, information is also available about PLC “Arkhangelsk”. Work on that facility was expected to start in 2019 (earlier – 2017). This facility is supposed to be located at 64°41’39.56″N 40°33’1.94″E. However, little appears to have changed by 2022 (see Figure 11).

In addition to the long-term storage facilities under the logistics centers, Russia has developed several “Military Equipment Storage and Repair Bases” (MESRBs). The main purpose of the MESRBs appears to be related to ensuring prompt mobilization at times of war. These bases can therefore be divided into two general groups: MESRBs designed to form Motor Rifle Brigades and MESRBs designed to form specialized brigades (eg, artillery, sapper, communications, pontoon bridge, repair and restoration and railway brigades, among others).

General information about the MESRBs designed to form separate motor rifle brigades (омсбр) is presented in Figure 12. Information about equipment that was expected to have been stored there as of 2013 is presented in Figure 13.

Publicly available information about the specialized MESRBs is patchier. We can determine that they number, with some gaps, from the 7004th to 7049th. General information known about these bases is presented in Figure 14.

Information about equipment that was expected to have been stored as of 2013 in the MESRBs planned as mobilizable artillery brigades is presented in Figure 15.

In 2018, a reorganization process began in which the MESRBs were reformed into “Mobilization Deployment Support Centers” (MDSCs). Information on these newer units is limited and the small amount of data available exists in direct relation to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 

In one of the original announcements of the reorganization, the Russian Ministry of Defense mentioned that a third of the MESRBs were going to be closed down, while the rest were to be transformed into MDSCs. There were a total of 47 MESRBs. We can expect anywhere between 30 and 33 MDSCs to have already been set up if this plan is running to schedule. Based on open source information, it has been possible to trace 32 such centers. The information that can be found is presented in Figure 16.

The 943rd MDSC, located near Novoozerne, Crimea, is by far the most commonly mentioned and researched. To date, Ukraine has struck this MDSC several times. See here (in Russian), here (in Russian), here (in Ukrainian), and here, for more details.

Open source enthusiasts have been attempting to count heavy military equipment available in Russian storage facilities based on commercial satellite imagery. Links to such counts are available in Figure 18.

It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss in detail the outcomes and implications of these open source equipment counts. Unfortunately, in some cases outdated storage facility designations have been used in these counts. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this article, it is evident that a significant drop in Russia’s stored equipment has been observed across many categories of its heavy equipment. For easier orientation and referencing, a full list of the facilities with their corresponding coordinates is found here.

Russia has been attempting to streamline its military storage system. The Soviet legacy that resulted in hundreds of dispersed storage facilities was first reorganized under the umbrella of several Logistics Centers in the late 2000s. A process started in the late 2010s, and still ongoing, aims to consolidate these storage facilities not just organizationally but also geographically into just several large production and logistics complexes.

At the same time the number of mobilization bases, themselves sizable storage facilities, has been reduced from approximately 47 to approximately 32 as of the early 2020s. Information about the practical implications of this reorganization process is scarce.

In the next part of this research, we will examine the key units participating in the process of turning this equipment from passive storage into active battlefield support.

IMPORTANT NOTE: As of February 26, 2024 the Western Military District was divided up into Moscow Military District and Leningrad Military District, as used to be the case before 2010. The storage facilities and MESRBs/MDSCs assigned to each of the two reconstituted military districts can be assumed based on their locations, but we have chosen not to make such assumptions due to the lack of public clarity on the subject.